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Abstract
Over the past four decades, fertility rates have fallen dramatically in most
middle- and low-income countries around the world. To analyze these devel-
opments, we study a quantitative model of endogenous human capital and fer-
tility choice, augmented to allow for social norms over the number of children.
The model enables us to gauge the role of human capital accumulation on the
decline in fertility and to simulate the implementation of population-control
policies aimed at affecting social norms and fostering the use of contraceptive
technologies. Using data on several socio-economic variables as well as infor-
mation on funding of population-control policies to parametrize the model, we
find that policies aimed at altering family-size norms have provided a signif-
icant impulse to accelerate and strengthen the decline in fertility that would
have otherwise gradually taken place as economies move to higher levels of
human capital.
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1 Introduction
Most developing countries experienced remarkable declines in total fertility rates
(TFR) over the past few decades. The world’s average TFR declined steadily during
this period, falling from 5 children per woman in 1960 to 2.4 in 2015. This decline
in fertility is not skewed by the experience of a few countries. In 1960, more than
half of the countries in the world experienced fertility rates greater than 6. By 2015,
the median TFR was 2.2 children per woman. Interestingly, the rapid decline in
fertility has taken place in countries at widely different levels of development.
De Silva and Tenreyro (2017) have argued that while socioeconomic factors play
an important role in the worldwide fertility decline, the timing and speed of the
decline over the past five decades suggests that the population control policies im-
plemented in many developing countries over this period might have played a sig-
nificant role in accelerating the process. The design of population-control programs
consisted of two main parts. The first was the diffusion of contraceptive supply
and information. The second was the implementation of public campaigns aimed
at reversing pro-natalist attitudes and establishing a new small-family norm. The
authors argue that the second strategy of employing public campaigns to reduce
desired levels of fertility was critical in complementing contraceptive provision.
To analyze the rapid decline in fertility, we study a model of endogenous fertility
and human capital accumulation, augmented to include a role for endogenously
evolving social norms on family size. In the model, individuals derive utility from
both the quantity and “quality” of children and dislike deviating from the social
norm on the number of children, where the norm is a weighted average of the fertility
of the previous generation and the replacement level of fertility, which is close to
two.1 Calibrating the model’s structural parameters and initial conditions to match
key moments in the data for developing countries in 1960, we use the model to
simulate the transition to the steady-state levels of fertility and human capital.
While the baseline model with no role for norms is able to endogenously generate
a slight decline in fertility, we find that incorporating social norms into the model
generates a much larger decline.
We then simulate the effect of population-control policies on family-size norms
using information on funding for family-planning programs. In particular, we allow
the weight placed on the fertility of the previous generation - family size is greatly
1We follow the literature’s jargon, where “quality” relates to the level of human capital of the
individual.
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influenced by the family of origin - to decline with the intensity of these programs,
given that the majority of these programs advocated having two children. We also
consider several alternative mechanisms that might explain the fertility decline, in-
cluding the fall in infant and child mortality and improvements in contraceptive
technologies (the second component of the population-control policies). The model
allows us to gauge quantitatively the role played by these different channels - human
capital accumulation, declining infant mortality, improved control over fertility, and
reductions in the social norm on family size - in generating the fertility decline.
We find that the baseline model without norms generates a small decline in fer-
tility. The inclusion of endogenously evolving social norms on fertility can generate
a decline in fertility which is twice as large as the decline generated by the baseline
mode, but still not enough to replicate the large declines in the data. We find that
policies aimed at altering family-size norms significantly accelerate and strengthen
the decline in fertility that would have otherwise gradually taken place as economies
move to higher levels of human capital, lower levels of infant mortality, and higher
supplies of contraceptive technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and
Section III explains the calibration strategy. Section IV presents the main results of
the paper and Section V studies various extensions. Section VI presents concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
This Section studies a simple quantitative model of endogenous human capital and
fertility choice. The goal is to gauge the impact of human capital accumulation and
population-control policies on the rapid fall in fertility experienced by most devel-
oping countries in recent decades. The model builds on the Barro-Becker framework
of fertility choice, incorporating human capital investment (see Barro and Becker
1989; Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Moav, 2005). We sequen-
tially extend the analysis along many dimensions. First and foremost, we augment
the model by introducing social norms on family size, which were a key target of
population-control policies in developing countries (de Silva and Tenreyro, 2017).
Our modelling of adherence to social norms borrows from the literature on social
distance and conformity (Jones 1984, Akerlof 1997) in that individuals derive disu-
tility from a function of the distance between their realized fertility and the social
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norm.2 We define the social norm on fertility as a weighted average of the fertility
rate of the previous generation and the replacement level of fertility. The first term
draws from the sociology literature that discusses the importance of reference groups
in forming fertility norms (e.g. Clay and Zuiches 1980). Norms on family size are
highly influenced by the family of origin.3 We choose the replacement level as the
second term in the average based on the observation that most economies appear to
be converging to a similar focal point for fertility, currently just about two children
per woman. This endogenously evolving norm naturally leads to a decline in fertility
that is larger than that generated in a model without social norms. In this baseline
model, we assume households count with the technology to control fertility. We
model the impact of the family planning programs and their mass communication
strategies as an increase in the weight placed on the replacement level of fertility,
causing the social norm on family size to shift downwards, accelerating the decline
even more.
In further extensions of the model we also consider the role played by the overall
fall in mortality rates. In a setting in which there is child mortality and uncertainty
about how many children survive to adulthood, we find that the decline in mortality
alone is not sufficient to explain the fall in fertility observed over the past few
decades.4 The decline in mortality rates did seem to have played an important
role in triggering population-control policies, but it is unlikely to have fueled the
fast fall in fertility through individual or decentralized responses, without the policy
intervention. A second extension considers the case in which households cannot
directly control fertility rates (contraception technologies are either not available
or imperfect) and the role played by increased access to contraception (the second
main component of population-control policies).
We do not explicitly model the possibility that children provide their parents with
2We deviate from the existing work on the impact of social norms on fertility in how we model
social norms. Munshi and Myaux (2005), Palivos (2001) and Bhattacharya and Chakraborty
(2012) model norms as the outcome of strategic decision-making and interaction, We take a simpler
specification that is more amenable to quantification and in line with the literature on external
habits or reference dependence.
3The impact of parental fertility on their children’s fertility is also explored in the demography
literature, focusing on developed countries. For example, Thornton 1980, Murphy 1999 and Kolk
2014.
4This point was previously made by Doepke (2005). Becker and Barro (1988)’s model predicts
that when mortality rates decrease, the total fertility rate falls, but the number of surviving
children remains the same. In survey data, we observe a decline not only in fertility rates, but
also in the desired number of children. Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) introduces a precautionary motive
to have children; in that context, a decline in mortality reduces both the fertility rate and the
number of (desired) surviving children.
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transfers in their old age, but our modelling choices can be recast in those terms,
as parents care about their children’s future earning capacity.5. In what follows, we
describe the model in more detail, specifying technologies and preferences.
2.1 Model setup
We consider an overlapping generation economy in which individuals live for two
periods: childhood and adulthood. In each period, the economy produces a single
consumption good using the productive capacity of the working adults and a fixed
factor as inputs, where the supply of the fixed factor is exogenous. The human
capital stock is determined by the fertility and educational choices of individuals.
2.2 Technology
Production occurs according to a constant returns to scale production technology.
Using the specification in Galor and Weil (2000), output at time t, Yt is:
Yt =
[
(H¯ +Ht)Lt)
]ρ
(AtX)
1−ρ, 0 < ρ < 1 (1)
where H¯ + Ht is the productive capacity of a worker, Lt is the working age popu-
lation, X is the fixed factor and At is the technology at time t, with AtX referring
to “effective resources”. The term H¯ is a physical labour endowment all individuals
are born with and Ht is human capital produced with investments in schooling.
Output per worker at time t, yt, is
yt = ((H¯ +Ht))
ρx1−ρt , (2)
where xt = AtX/Lt is the effective resources per worker at time t.
As in Galor and Weil (2000), we assume that the return to the fixed factor
is zero.This assumption helps to keep the model simple so that the only source
of earnings for households is labour income, which is a reasonable description of
households’ funding in developing countries. The factor X can then be interpreted
as some productive public good which does not yield private returns to the citizens.
(Galor and Weil (2000)’s interpretation is that there are no property rights over this
5There is a growing literature which addresses these inter-generational transfers explicitly (see
for example Boldrin and Jones 2002, Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin 2014, Choukhmane, Coeur-
dacier and Jin 2014)
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resource in the country.) Alternatively, as in Cespedes and Velasco (2012), one can
think of X as being owned by a small group of “elite” individuals, who spend all
the returns from X abroad (and whose behaviour we do not consider in our model).
The return to productive labour, wt, is then given by its average product:
wt =
(
xt
(H¯ +Ht)
)1−ρ
(3)
2.3 Households
Each household has a single decision maker, the working adult. Individuals within a
generation are identical. Children consume a fraction of their parents’ time. Work-
ing adults supply labour inelastically, decide on their consumption, the number of
children, and their education in period t.
Parents are motivated by altruism towards their children but are conscious of
the social norm on the number of children that a family should have. As such, while
parents derive utility from their children (both the quantity and the quality), they
derive disutility from deviating from the social norm. The utility function for a
working age individual of generation t can be expressed as:
Ut = u(Ct; nt; qt+1)− ϕg(nt, nˆt), (4)
where u is a standard utility function over three goods: Ct, denoting consumption
at time t, nt, which denotes the number of children, and qt+1, which indicates the
quality of children as measured by their future earning potential. Following Galor
and Weil (2000) and Moav (2005), we assume qt+1 = wt+1(H¯ + Ht+1), where wt+1
is the future wage per unit of productive labour of a child, and H¯ + Ht+1 is the
productive capacity of a child. The factor ϕ > 0 governs the disutility from deviating
from the social norm and g(nt, nˆt) is a function of the deviation of the chosen number
of children, nt, from the social norm on family size, nˆt, where g11(nt, nˆt) > 0 and
g12(nt, nˆt) < 0. The first condition implies that movements further away from the
norm involves heavier penalties, while the second implies that the marginal cost of
the additional child is decreasing in the social norm. We model the social norm on
family size as a weighted average between the previous generation’s fertility, nt−1,
and the replacement level of fertility, n∗, so that nˆt can be expressed as:
6
nˆt = φn
∗ + (1− φ)nt−1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (5)
The individual’s choice of desired number of children and optimal education
investment for each child is subject to a standard budget constraint. While parental
income is given by wt(H¯ + Ht), we assume that a fixed fraction of income, τ0, is
spent on each child regardless of education and a discretionary education cost for
each child, τ1ht, which is increasing in the level of education, ht, is chosen by the
parents. The remaining income is spent on consumption.6 The budget constraint
at time t is therefore,
Ct = [1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt]wt(H¯ +Ht) (6)
Following Becker, Barro, and Tamura (1990) and Ehrlich and Kim (2005), we
specify the human capital production function as:
Ht+1 = zt(H¯ +Ht)ht, (7)
where H¯ +Ht is the productive capacity of the parent, ht is the educational invest-
ment (or schooling) in each child and zt is the human capital production technology.
This specification of productive capacity prevents perfect intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital, allowing for positive levels of human capital even for
children whose parents have no schooling (Ht = 0).
2.4 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, agents and firms optimally solve their problems and all
markets clear.Let v = (H¯ + Ht, nt−1). A competitive equilibrium for this economy
consists of a collection of policy functions for households {Ct(v), nt(v), ht(v)}, and
prices wt such that:
1. Policy functions Ct(v), nt(v), and ht(v) maximize
u(Ct;nt; qt+1)− ϕg(nt, nˆt)
6It is also possible to interpret the constraint as a restriction on the total amount of time
available to work and have and raise children. In that case, τ0 would be the fraction of time that
has to be spent on raising a child regardless of the education level.
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subject to the budget constraint (6), human capital production function (7)
and (Ct, nt, ht) ≥ 0;
2. wt satisfies (3); and
3. Markets clear such that:
Ct = [1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt]yt
3 Calibration
In the policy experiments that we carry out, we examine the transition of the econ-
omy from a given initial condition to a steady state level of fertility and human
capital investment. Our calibration strategy, therefore, involves choosing structural
parameters and initial conditions so that the outcomes of the model in the first
period match the appropriate moments for consumption, income, fertility, educa-
tion and population in developing countries in 1960.7 Since the economic agent in
this model is an individual, the fertility rate in the model is one half of the total
fertility rates in the data. Similarly, we interpret the units of investment in human
capital per child, ht, as years of education.
8 In addition, one period in the model
corresponds to the length of a generation, around 25 years.
The data on household consumption, per capita GDP, population and fertility are
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset while
the data on average years of education are taken from the Barro-Lee educational
attainment datasets (Barro and Lee 2015, Barro and Lee 2013).
3.1 Technology
We set the productive labour share of income, ρ, to 0.66. Estimates of total factor
productivity in East Asian countries over the 1966-1990 period by Young (1995)
7We refer to all countries which were not classified as OECD countries prior to 1970 as developing
countries in the starting period. 1960 is the first year for which cross-country data on fertility,
income, education and consumption are available.
8The data available is the average years of education of the adult population (aged 25 and
above). As such, the investment in education for children born in a given period is observed in
the data as the average years of education of the adult population in the next period. I.e., if the
length of a generation is 25 years, h1960 is given by the average years of education of the adult
population in 1985.
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indicate that on average, annual TFP growth over the period ranged from -0.003
in Singapore to 0.024 in Taiwan. As such, we will assume a constant annual TFP
growth rate of 0.018 which is compounded to obtain the TFP growth rate between
generations, gA.
9 In addition, we assume that there is no growth in the technology
used in human capital production, zt.
3.2 Cost of childrearing
Household expenditure surveys report the fraction of household expenditure allo-
cated to education. In our model, this fraction is represented by τ1ntht. This ranges
from 2.6 percent in India in the period 2007-2008 to 5.5 percent in Singapore in
2012-2013. However, the value for τ1, calculated using corresponding values for nt
and ht from the data, is much more uniform, around 0.3 percent.
10 We therefore set
τ1 to 0.003. We then use the household budget constraint to back out the value for
τ0, given the initial levels of income, consumption, fertility and education.
3.3 Preferences
Following the literature, we assume utility is additively log linear in consumption,
the number of children, the quality of children and social norms:
Ut = lnCt + α lnnt + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕg(nt, nˆt), (8)
α > 0 reflects preferences for children, θ > 0 for child quality. As noted in Akerlof
(1997), the use of the absolute value of the difference between individual fertility and
the social norm gives rise to multiple equilibria. We use a more tractable functional
form given by:
g(nt, nˆt) = (nt − nˆt)2,
where individuals derive disutility from deviating above as well as below the social
norm and deviations in either direction are penalized symmetrically. In Section 5, we
consider a different functional form which treats upward and downward deviations
asymmetrically and find that the results are very similar.
9Our specification of utility implies that the value of gA affects the simulations only through the
initial value for the human capital stock as wages do not have an effect on fertility or human capital
investment decisions. Assuming gA = 0 barely changes the results of the quantitative exercise.
10See the appendix for the full set of countries and expenditure statistics.
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Given these preferences, the first order condition for nt is given by:
α
nt
=
(τ0 + τ1ht)
1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt + 2ϕ(nt − nˆt) (9)
The first-order condition equates the marginal benefit of having children with the
marginal cost. The first term on the right hand side is the marginal cost in terms
of foregone consumption while the second term will be a cost if the additional child
pushes the total number of children over the social norm.
The first-order condition for ht is:
θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τ1nt
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt) , (10)
where the right hand side is the marginal utility to the parent from giving her child
an additional unit of education and the left hand side is the marginal cost in terms
of foregone consumption.
Our specification of utility leaves us with three preference parameters (α, θ,
and ϕ) to be calibrated. We also require initial values for Ht and zt. We start by
calibrating a baseline model in which individuals do not care about norms (ϕ = 0)
and pin down α from the first-order condition for nt, using the cross-country macro
data for developing countries for 1960. We use the per capita output growth in the
economy to pin down H¯+Ht+1
H¯+Ht
(which we will refer to as gH , hereafter). Then, for
given values of zt (which we choose to match the empirical estimates of the returns
to schooling) and H¯, we use the first order condition for ht and the human capital
production function to obtain values for θ and H1, the level of human capital of
parents in the initial period.11
11Rearranging the human capital production function gives:
Ht = (
1
gH − ztht − 1)H¯
where gH =
H¯+Ht+1
H¯+Ht
. In order to obtain Ht > 0, it is required that
gH−1
ht
< zt ≤ gHht . Using values
for gH and ht from the data, we can obtain an upper and lower bound for zt.
The Mincerian return to schooling is given by ρztgH in our model. Setting zt close to the lower
bound implies a return to an additional year of education of around 0.1, which is in line with the
empirical estimates of the returns to schooling.
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3.4 Norms
We use the first order condition for fertility from the full model (equation 9) to
obtain a value for φ, for given values of ϕ and nt−1. We do not have enough
moments in the data to back out ϕ and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
empirical estimates of this parameter. Therefore, we set ϕ = 0.1 (the estimates of
ϕ for later periods indicate that this value is reasonable). While data on fertility
rates in developing countries prior to 1960 is scarce, we set n0 to 3.5 (meaning seven
children per woman - recall that in the model nt is fertility per household) based
on estimates of fertility for several non-European countries in the early twentieth
century provided by Therborn (2004). Finally, the replacement level of fertility, n∗,
is set to 1, reflecting a replacement level fertility rate of 2.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the calibration exercise.
3.5 Estimating the change in φ
We model the role of population-control policies in changing the social norms on
family size by an increase in φ. In order to estimate the value of φ in subsequent
periods, we estimate by ordinary least squares, the first-order condition for fertility
using data for 2010, holding all parameters other than φ and ϕ constant. In other
words, only preferences on how much individuals care about conforming to social
norms and the weight placed on the replacement rate of fertility are allowed to
change. In addition, we model φ as a function of the intensity of family-planning
programs. Specifically, we set φ = φ0 + φ1P, where P is family planning program
intensity, measured by the logarithm of per capita funds for family planning, with
the data on family planning funds compiled from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978),
Nortman (1982), and Ross, Mauldin, and Miller (1993). This gives rise to the
following estimable equation:
α
nt
− (τ0 + τ1ht)
1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt = 2ϕ(nt−nt−1) + 2ϕφ0(nt−1−n
∗) + 2ϕφ1P (nt−1−n∗) (11)
We estimate the equation using data on fertility, consumption and GDP per
capita for 2010, and the average value of per capita funds for family planning over
the 1970-2000 period.12 Ideally, P would be the total spending per capita on family
12The budget constraint gives (τ0+τ1ht)1−(τ0+τ1ht)nt =
wt(H¯+Ht)
Ct
− 1 = ytCt − 1.
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Table 1: Calibration of structural parameters
Value Description/Source
Parameters
ρ 0.66 Productive labour share of output
gA 1.56 TFP growth (Young 1995)
τ0 0.04 Targeted to match household consumption in 1960
τ1 0.003
Targeted to match share of household expenditure
on education
gH 2.61
Targeted to match per capita output and popula-
tion growth
α 0.18
Targeted to match fertility rate of 5.96 in 1960 in
baseline model
θ 0.06
Targeted to match years of education of 3.67 in
1960
ϕ 0.1
Disutility from deviating from social norm on fer-
tility
φ 0.21
Targeted to match fertility rate of 5.96 in extended
model
n∗ 1 Corresponds to a replacement rate of fertility of 2
Initial conditions
H¯ 1 Labour endowment
n0 3.5
Targeted to match fertility rates in developing
countries in early 20th century
z 0.44 Targeted to match returns to schooling of 0.1
H0 0.004
Obtained from human capital production function,
given gH
Notes: The table reports the calibrated parameter values and initial conditions and the sources from which they
are obtained.
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Table 2: Estimation of ϕ and φ
Parameter Value
ϕ 0.36
(0.001)
φ0 0.07
(0.410)
φ1 0.1
(0.057)
φ (= φ0 + φ1P¯ ) 0.44
Observations 52
R2 0.27
Notes: The table reports the results from estimat-
ing Equation 11. The estimation is carried out
using data on fertility, consumption and GDP per
capita for 2010, and the average annual per capita
spending on family planning over the 1970-2000
period. φ is calculated as φ = φ0 + φ1P¯ , where P¯
is the sample average of per capita spending on
family planning. Values in parentheses are p-values
of the regression coefficients from which the values
for ϕ, φ0, and φ1 are backed out and are based on
robust standard errors.
planning programs over this period. However, given that for many countries we have
data only for one or two years, we use the average per capita funding over the period
1970-2000. Note that this exercise is an attempt to recover a numerical estimate for
φ which can be used in the quantitative analysis, rather than to establish a causal
link between the family planning programs and fertility.
The estimation of Equation 11 provides us with values for ϕ, φ0, and φ1. We
find that the coefficients of the first and third terms in the equation (corresponding
to 2ϕ and 2ϕφ1) are significantly different from zero and that the obtained values
for ϕ, φ0, and φ1 have the expected signs and magnitudes (see Table 2). The value
of ϕ is 0.36, indicating that our initial calibration of 0.1 is reasonable, allowing an
increase in the importance placed on adhering to norms over time. We calculate φ
at the sample average of P to obtain a value of 0.44, which shows that the weight
on n∗ has doubled over the past fifty years.
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4 Results
The dynamics of fertility and human capital accumulation in the economy are gov-
erned by equations 5, 7, 9, and 10.13 We now use the calibrated model to investigate
how the two channels in our model, human capital accumulation and the presence
of social norms on fertility, contribute to fertility decline. We begin from an initial
level of human capital stock and fertility and examine the transition to a steady
state.
We start by considering a baseline model in which individuals do not care about
social norms (ϕ = 0) and the only mechanism by which fertility falls is the faster
accumulation of human capital. We compare this model with our extended model of
fertility and social norms. We consider two cases: the first in which φ and ϕ remain
unchanged over time and the second in which φ and ϕ rise to the values estimated
in the previous section (referred to as the model with policy changes). Since the
estimated values are for 2010, we set φ and ϕ in 1985 to be in between the values of
the initial calibration for 1960 and the estimated values for 2010. We do not impose
any changes to the parameters after the third period.
Figure 1 shows the model’s predicted path of TFR and investment in education
(measured in years of education) under the different versions outlined above. The
corresponding values in the data (only available for the first three periods for fertility
and education) are marked by crosses.
The baseline model (given by the blue dash and dot line) in which individuals
do not care about norms generates a very small decline in fertility. TFR falls to
5.3 in t = 2 and reaches a steady state of around 4.9 children per woman while
investment in education rises to 5.8 years of schooling in t = 2 and reaches a steady
state of roughly 7.2. The inclusion of social norms on fertility generates a larger
decline in fertility, even when φ and ϕ remain unchanged. In this case, TFR falls
from 6 children per woman to 3.6 within six generations and a steady state of
3.2 is reached after approximately ten periods. At the same time, human capital
investment reaches a steady state of around 11 years of schooling. The existence of
endogenously evolving social norms on fertility is enough to generate a decline in
fertility which is twice as large as the decline generated by the baseline model.
We next consider the effect of the population control policies (given by the green
solid line), which we interpret as an increase in φ. As can be expected, the increase
13Note that since neither first order condition depends on wt, the production side of the economy
doesn’t affect the dynamics of fertility and human capital.
14
Figure 1: Transition to steady state
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education for the different versions of the model. The
dash and dot line corresponds to the baseline model where ϕ = 0. The dashed line represents the case where φ and
ϕ remain unchanged over time, while the solid line represents changes in φ to 0.35 and 0.44 at t = 2 and t = 3,
respectively and changes in ϕ to 0.25 and 0.36 at t = 2 and t = 3 respectively. The points marked by “+” refer to
the values observed in the data where t = 2 is 1985 and t = 3 is 2010.
in φ (a larger weight placed on the replacement level of fertility) generates a much
larger decline in fertility, increase in education and a quicker convergence to the
steady state. We allow φ to rise from 0.21 in t = 1 to 0.35 and then 0.44 in the
two subsequent periods, which corresponds to a change in the norm on number
of children from around 6 children in the initial period to around 3.4 by t = 3.
Accordingly, the model predicts a decline in TFR to 3.4 at t = 3 and fertility reaches
a steady state of around 2.4 after 6 periods. At the same time, years of schooling
rises from 4 to around 10 in just three generations. The increase in ϕ is slightly less
important, quantitatively, than the increase in φ. If we set the starting level of ϕ
to 0.35 (which cannot be ruled out given that the initial value was calibrated), the
resulting transition path is hardly different from that illustrated in Figure 1.
Comparing the results of the model with the data indicates that the inclusion of
social norms with an increase in φ over time improves the predictions of fertility and
years of schooling considerably. The model predicts years of schooling well while
predicting levels of fertility that are slightly higher than what is observed in the
data. However, the predicted steady state level of fertility is close to two children
per woman. Note that we do not allow φ and ϕ to change after t = 3. If we allowed
φ to increase continuously over time, convergence to a steady state low fertility rate
would be even faster. The changes in φ which would be required to exactly match
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the data would be an increase to 0.6 in t = 2 and then to 0.9 by t = 3. While we
estimate the change in φ captured by spending on family planning programs, it is
likely that when taking into account other factors such as increased access to mass
media and modernization, the actual increase in φ is larger than that estimated in
this paper.
To summarize, this quantitative exercise points to the importance of changing
social norms on family size for the decline in fertility observed in developing countries
over the past few decades. We use data on family planning program funds to capture
the change in social norms brought about by these programs which were widely
adopted in developing countries during this period. The results suggest that the
change in social norms brought about by these programs considerably accelerated
the fertility decline. This is consistent with empirical studies that find evidence
of the effectiveness of public persuasion measures in reducing fertility (La Ferrara,
Chong and Duryea 2012 and Bandiera et al. 2014).
5 Extensions and robustness checks
In this section we discuss a number of extensions of the model. First, we extend
the model to allow a role for declining infant and child mortality in the fertility
fall. Next, we incorporate imperfect control over fertility, allowing for a role for im-
provements in contraceptive technologies. Finally, we consider the effect of changing
the specification of disutility from deviating from the norm, allowing upward and
downward deviations to be treated asymmetrically.
5.1 Including mortality
The model presented in the previous section did not take into account the mortality
decline observed in developing countries during this period. In this section, we
extend our model to include uncertainty regarding the number of children that
survive to adulthood. We then investigate the impact of an increase in survival
rates on fertility and human capital investment. We follow Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) in
how we incorporate mortality into the model.14
14In the original Barro-Becker (1989) framework, child mortality is modeled as an explicit cost
of childrearing. Doepke (2005) studies three variations of this model: a baseline model where
fertility choice is continuous and there is no uncertainty over the number of surviving children,
which is contrasted with an extension involving discrete fertility choice and stochastic mortality
and another with sequential fertility choice. He finds that while the total fertility rate falls as child
mortality declines in each model, the number of surviving children increases, and concludes that
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Parents choose a number of children, nt, but only Nt of the infants survive
to childhood and all children survive to adulthood. Parents spend on rearing and
educating their surviving children and derive utility from the quantity and quality of
these children.15 In addition, parents care about how the number of their surviving
children compares with the social norm on family size. The utility function for an
adult of generation t can then be written as:
EtUt = Et lnCt + α lnNt + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕ(Nt − Nˆt)2 (12)
where Nˆt = φn
∗ + (1− φ)Nt−1 is the norm on family size.
Expected utility is maximized subject to,
Ct = [1− (τ0 + τ1ht)Nt]wt(H¯ +Ht), (13)
and the human capital production function (7).
As in Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), Nt is a random variable drawn from a binomial
distribution, with st ∈ [0, 1] the survival probability of each infant. We use a second-
order approximation of the expected utility function around the mean value of Nt,
i.e. ntst. The approximated expected utility function is given by:
EtUt = Et

ln[(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)ntst)wt(H¯ +Ht)]+
α ln(ntst) + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]
−ϕ(ntst − Nˆt)2 − ntst(1−st)2 [
(
(τ0+τ1ht)
(τ0+τ1ht)ntst)
)2
+ α
(ntst)2
+ 2ϕ]
 (14)
which incorporates the budget constraint (13). The last three terms represent the
disutility arising from uncertainty in the number of infants that survive to adulthood.
The first-order conditions for fertility and human capital investment become:
α
nt
(1 +
(1− st)
2ntst
) =
2ϕst(ntst + Nˆt) + ϕst(1− st)+
(τ0+τ1ht)st
1−(τ0+τ1ht)ntst
[
1 + 1+(τ0+τ1ht)ntst
2(1−(τ0+τ1ht)ntst)
(τ0+τ1ht)(1−st)
(1−(τ0+τ1ht)ntst)
] (15)
factors other than declining infant and child mortality were responsible for the fertility transition
observed in industrialized countries.
15This is a slight deviation from Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) where education is provided before the
uncertainty is realized.
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θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τ1ntst
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)ntst)
[
1 +
(τ0 + τ1ht)(1− st)
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)ntst)2
]
(16)
The key difference between this setup and that in Section 2 is that there is now
an additional term in the marginal cost of both fertility and schooling which reflects
the cost of uncertainty.
5.1.1 Calibration and results
The calibration exercise is carried out in the same way as before - we start from a
model with mortality and no norms to back out all the parameters except φ and then
use the extended model with norms and mortality to get an initial value for φ. We
use the mortality rate for children below 5 years of age (measured as the number of
deaths of children below 5 years of age per 1000 live births) for developing countries
in 1960 (from the WDI database) as a measure of 1− st. The re-calibration causes
τ0, α, θ, and φ to change. τ0, α and θ change by very little (to 0.05, 0.17 and 0.05,
respectively) whereas φ changes significantly (to 0.02, much lower than 0.21 in the
model without mortality).
To identify the change in φ and ϕ over the past two periods, we carry out the
same estimation exercise as before, again setting φ = φ0 + φ1P but now using
Equation 15. We see an increase in φ and ϕ, with a much larger relative increase in
the value of φ than in the model without mortality. Table 3 shows the values of the
parameters obtained from the estimation.
We then plot the transition paths of fertility and human capital to their steady
states for three cases: the baseline model with no norms or mortality (given by the
blue dashed line), the model with falling mortality rates and no norms (given by the
pink dotted line), and the extended model of mortality and social norms (given by
the green solid line). We allow st to rise over time from 0.78 in t = 1 to 0.91 and
0.96 in t = 2 and t = 3 as seen in the data. As before, since the estimation of φ and
ϕ was for 2010, values of φ and ϕ for 1985 are set to be in between the values of the
initial calibration for 1960 and the estimates for 2010 and do not change after the
third period.
As Figure 2 shows, the incorporation of mortality into the baseline model gener-
ates a larger decline in fertility than the baseline model which only includes human
capital accumulation with TFR converging to around 3.9 children per woman rather
than 4.9. However, the two models are not very different in their predictions of hu-
man capital investment. This is because the decline in the number of surviving
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Table 3: Estimation of ϕ and φ with mortality
Parameter Value
ϕ 0.29
(0.006)
φ0 -0.32
(0.118)
φ1 0.15
(0.096)
φ (= φ0 + φ1P¯ ) 0.21
Observations 50
R2 0.37
Notes: The table reports the results from esti-
mating Equation 15. The estimation is carried
out using data on fertility, child mortality rates,
consumption and GDP per capita for 2010, and
the average annual per capita spending on family
planning over the 1970-2000 period. φ is calculated
as φ = φ0 + φ1P¯ , where P¯ is the sample average
of per capita spending on family planning. Values
in parentheses are p-values of the regression coeffi-
cients from which the values for ϕ, φ0, and φ1 are
backed out and are based on robust standard errors.
children is very similar in these two models (see Figure 3). In the baseline model
that incorporates the mortality decline, the number of surviving children drops from
4.7 to just 3.9 (compared to the decline from 5.9 to 4.9 in the baseline model with-
out mortality). By contrast, including a social norm that falls over time generates
a large decline in the number of surviving children - a drop from 4.6 to 2.6. Given
that the investment in schooling is made for surviving children, a smaller decline in
surviving children leads to a smaller increase in the years of schooling.
Our modelling of mortality, which is based on Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), allows the
mortality decline to generate a decline in fertility through a hoarding effect, where
the risk of child mortality results in a precautionary demand for children. The
decline in fertility generated by the decline in social norms is slightly smaller than
that in the model described in the previous section because uncertainty about the
number of surviving children leads to higher fertility as an insurance against infant
mortality. However, the presence of social norms that decline over time still leads
to a significant acceleration in the fertility decline, indicating that the mortality
transition cannot rule out the role of the population control policies in the fertility
fall. Taken as a whole, we would argue that while the decline in mortality rates did
play an important role in triggering the introduction of population-control policies,
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Figure 2: Incorporating mortality
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the three versions of the model. The
dashed line represents the baseline model with no mortality or social norms while the dotted line represents the
baseline model augmented to include mortality where st rises to 0.91 at t=2, and to 0.96 at t=3, where it remains
in all successive periods. The solid line represents the model with mortality and social norms. Here, st rises as
described earlier while φ rises to 0.15 and 0.21 in the second and third periods, while ϕ rises to 0.2 and 0.28. The
points marked “+” refer to the values observed in the data.
its role in precipitating the fast fall in fertility through individual responses, without
the policy intervention, is less clear.
5.2 Incorporating unwanted fertility
So far we have simulated the effect of population control policies on the fertility
decline by focusing on their role in changing the norm on family size. We now extend
the model such that individuals do not perfect control fertility. In other words, we
allow the lack of contraceptive technologies to cause a discrepancy between the
desired and actual number of children.16 This allows us to examine the impact of
a reduction in unwanted fertility caused by the introduction of widespread modern
contraceptives, which was the second main component of the population control
policies.
We do not explicitly model the choice of contraceptive usage (see, for example,
Cavalcanti, Kocharkov and Santos (2017)) but consider individuals’ ability to control
fertility to be exogenously determined. So while the production side of the model is
the same as before, we now assume that parents’ inability to perfectly control their
fertility leads to a distinction between the desired or chosen number of children, ndt ,
16The key difference between this and the mortality extension is that now individuals face the
risk of overshooting their desired number of children whereas in the case of uncertainty about
mortality, individuals faced the risk of ending up with less children than they wanted.
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Figure 3: Number of surviving children
Notes: The figure plots the number of surviving children predicted by the three versions of the model. The dashed
line represents the baseline model with no mortality or social norms while the dotted line represents the baseline
model augmented to include mortality where st rises to 0.91 at t=2, and to 0.96 at t=3, where it remains in all
successive periods. The solid line represents the model with mortality and social norms.
and the actual number of children, nat . Specifically,
nat = n
d
t + εt,
where εt is a stochastic error term causing the desired number of children, n
d
t , to
differ from the actual number of children, nat .
Individuals now have to maximize expected utility which, for an adult of gener-
ation t is given by:
EtUt = Et[lnCt + α lnn
a
t + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕ(nat − nˆt)2], (17)
where Et denotes expectations as of time t.
Individuals maximize expected utility with respect to the human capital pro-
duction function (same as before) and the budget constraint, which is now changed
slightly to:
Ct = [1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nat ]wt(H¯ +Ht) (18)
The formulation of the expected utility function requires some distributional
assumptions about unwanted fertility, εt. The data on wanted fertility rates in de-
veloping countries (obtained from Demographic and Health Surveys) indicates that
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εt is usually positive and has a positively skewed distribution. We assume that εt
follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ. Thus, a reduction in λ translates to a
reduction in uncertainty as well as average unwanted fertility. We then carry out
a second-order approximation of the expected utility around the mean of unwanted
fertility. Substituting in the budget constraint and human capital production func-
tion, the household problem can be rewritten as:
{ndt , ht} = arg max

ln[(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)(ndt + λ))wt(H¯ +Ht)]
+θ ln[Wt+1(H¯ + zt(H¯ +Ht)ht)]
+α ln[ndt + λ]− ϕ(ndt + λ− nˆt)2
−λ
2
[ (τ0+τ1ht)
2
(1−(τ0+τ1ht)(ndt+λ))2
+ 2ϕ+ α
(ndt+λ)
2 ]
 (19)
subject to: (ndt , ht) ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions for ndt and ht are given by:
α
ndt + λ
=
(τ0+τ1ht)
(1−(τ0+τ1ht)(ndt+λ))
+ 2ϕ(ndt + λ− nˆt)+
λ[ (τ0+τ1ht)
3
(1−(τ0+τ1ht)(ndt+λ))3
− α
(ndt+λ)
3 ]
(20)
θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τ1(n
d
t + λ)
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)(ndt + λ))
+ λ[
τ1(τ0 + τ1ht)
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)(ndt + λ))3
] (21)
where the last term on the right hand side in Equation 21 reflects the cost of uncer-
tainty. Since parents derive utility from all children (unwanted or not), the second
line in Equation 20 reflects the cost of uncertainty adjusted for the gain in utility
caused by having an extra child.
5.2.1 Calibration and results
The calibration strategy follows the same procedure as the main model, leaving pa-
rameters α, θ, τ0, τ1, gH , ρ, and n
∗ and the initial conditions unchanged. However,
φ needs to be re-calibrated using Equation 20 for given values of ϕ and λ. The pa-
rameter λ is chosen using data on wanted fertility rates obtained from Demographic
and Health Surveys which start in the late 1980s. Unwanted fertility (calculated as
the difference between TFR and wanted fertility rate) is around 1 birth, on average,
in the 1980s. Since this is well after the introduction of the oral contraceptive pill
and the implementation of many family planning programs worldwide, we set initial
λ to 1 (reflecting an average of 2 unwanted births). We then use Equation 20, to
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Figure 4: Incorporating unwanted fertility
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the two models. The dashed line
represents the model with social norms and imperfect control over fertility while the solid line represents the model
with only social norms. In both models φ rises to 0.35 and then 0.44 in the second and third periods. Similarly, ϕ
rises to 0.25 and then 0.36. In the model with uncertainty, λ falls from 1 in the first period to 0.53 in the second,
0.28 in the third and then to 0.1, where it remains in all successive periods. The points marked by “+” refer to the
values observed in the data.
obtain the value of φ, with ϕ set to 0.1 as before. This gives us φ = 0.21 which is
the same as in the main model. As such, we allow φ andϕ to rise to the same levels
estimated in Section 3.
We then compare the transition paths of fertility and human capital for this
extended model and the norms-only model using the same policy experiment of
rising φ and ϕ, but also allowing λ to fall over time in the extended model. The
fall in λ reflects the increased contraceptive prevalence over the past few decades.
Using the data on wanted fertility we allow λ to fall from 1 in the first period to
0.53 in the second, 0.35 in the third and then remain at 0.1 in all successive periods.
Figure 4 plots the two transition paths.
As seen in Figure 4, predicted fertility in the two models is very similar, with
the presence of unwanted fertility raising TFR slightly above the norms-only model.
The main difference between the two models is in the predicted years of education.
Uncertainty slows down the accumulation of human capital and keeps investment
in education at a lower level than the norms-only model.
The comparison between the two models indicate that changing the norms on
fertility has a much larger effect on fertility decisions than merely increasing access
to contraception. This is consistent with the fact that many of the family planning
programs supplemented their supply-side strategies of increasing access to contra-
ception with large scale mass media campaigns to promote smaller family sizes. This
23
point was made by demographers Enke (1960) and Davis (1967) at early stages of the
global population control movement, and later by Becker (1992), who argued that
family planning programs focused on increasing contraceptive usage are effective
only when the value of having children is lowered.
5.3 Functional form of disutility from deviation from the
norm
We now consider the robustness of our results to an alternative specification for the
disutility from deviating from the norm. In particular, we now use a functional form
that treats upward and downward deviations from the norm asymmetrically with
deviations below the norm being penalized more heavily than deviations above. This
would be consistent with societal norms in developing countries where not having
children is considered taboo. For this purpose, we set:
ng(nt, nˆ) = [ln(nt/nˆt)]
2
The first order condition for fertility changes to the following:
α
nt
=
(τ0 + τ1ht)
(1− (τ0 + τ1ht)nt) + 2ϕ
1
nt
ln(nt/nˆt) (22)
while the first order condition for human capital investment remains unchanged.
Under the same parameter and initial condition values as in the previous section,
we plot the transition paths of fertility and investment in human capital to their
steady state values. We consider two experiments: one in which φ and ϕ increase
and the other in which both parameters remain unchanged over time. We compare
the results of this model with the results of the main model with quadratic disutility
from deviating from the norm.
The results show that the two functional forms yield results that are qualita-
tively very similar. The decline in fertility is slightly smaller in the log disutility
version (corresponding to the red dotted line), reflecting the increasing penalties for
deviating below the norm. The results under the two functional forms show greater
divergence when φ and ϕ remain unchanged. As described before, the model with
quadratic disutility converges to a TFR close to 3.2 and approximately 11 years of
schooling after around ten periods. However, the model with log disutility converges
to a TFR of approximately 4.1 and just 8.8 years of schooling.
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Figure 5: Comparing functional forms
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the full model under two functional
forms: quadratic disutility from norm deviation (main analysis) and log disutility from norm deviation. For each
functional form we consider two experiments: one where φ and ϕ rise (to the levels estimated in Section 3.5 and
the other where they remain unchanged. The solid and dashed lines correspond to quadratic disutility with and
without policy changes, respectively. The dotted and dash-dot lines correspond to log disutility with and without
policy changes. The points marked by “+” refer to the values observed in the data.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a tractable model that allows us to quantitatively assess
the role of different mechanisms driving the large declines in fertility experienced by
developing countries over the past few decades. In particular, we examine the role of
population-control policies aimed at affecting social norms and fostering contracep-
tive technologies. The model builds on the Barro-Becker framework of endogenous
fertility choice, incorporating human capital accumulation and social norms over
the number of children. Using data on several socio-economic variables as well as
information on funding for family planning programs to parametrize the model, we
simulate the implementation of population-control policies. We also consider several
extensions such as adding a role for the mortality decline and improvements in con-
traceptive technologies. The model suggests that, while a decline in fertility would
have gradually taken place as economies move to higher levels of human capital and
lower levels of infant and child mortality, policies aimed at altering the norms on
family size significantly accelerate and strengthen the decline.
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Appendix
Household spending on education
Country τ1ntht nt ht τ1 Year Source
India 0.026 1.4 5.94 0.003 2007/08 Tilak 2009
Singapore 0.055 0.6 11 0.008 2012/13 Singapore Dept. of Statistics 2014
Sub Saharan Africa 0.042 2.75 5.22 0.003 2001-08 Foko, Tiyab and Husson 2012
Sri Lanka 0.039 1.71 7.22 0.003 1980/81 Department of Census and Statistics
Sri Lanka 0.056 1.22 10.67 0.004 2012/13 of Sri Lanka 2015
Latin America and 0.019 1.1 8.71 0.002 2010 Regional Bureau of Education for Latin
the Caribbean America and the Caribbean 2013
South Koreaa 0.039 0.61 12.96 0.005 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Chilea 0.037 0.929 10.35 0.004 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Indonesiaa 0.007 1.22 8.02 0.001 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Notes: The table reports the fraction of household expenditure spent on education and the backed out value for τ1, which is the fraction of
household expenditure spent per children per year of education using data for different countries and years. The sources for data on household
expenditure on education in given in the last column while data for the corresponding years on fertility and years of schooling are obtained from
the World Development Indicators and Barro-Lee datasets. Given that years of education are published at 5 yearly intervals, we choose the closest
year for backing out τ1.
aτ1ntht calculated using private spending as a % of GDP and household expenditure as a % of GDP. Private spending on education excludes
expenditure outside educational institutions such as textbooks purchased by families, private tutoring for students and student living costs so
possibly underestimates household spending on education.
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